The Partisan War

'Soviet citizens are to establish, in the areas occupied by the enemy, Partisan units on foot and on horseback.
Insufferable conditions must be created for the enemy. You must follow him everywhere and annihilate his forces'.

Stalin July 1941

The Partisan war on the Eastern Front played a significant and often unrecognised role in the campaign. The Partisan organization grew from humble beginnings, with small, disorganised groups of poorly trained and equipped fighters, to emerge in early 1944 as a highly motivated, well organised, well trained and equipped force totalling some 700,000 men and women. Partisan forces constantly disrupted the German rear areas, destroying lines of communication and supply and exacting a heavy toll on moral and resources. The extent of the Partisan threat resulted in the Germans deploying 25 dedicated security Divisions, 30 separate security Regiments and more than 100 police Battalions to help safeguard the rear areas.

Areas of Operation

Belorussia

Belorussia had the largest number of Partisan groups, numbering over 300,000 fighters, under the leadership of Panteleymon Ponomarenko, Petr Masherov, Kiril Mazurov and others. As early as the spring of 1942 they were able to effectively harass German troops and significantly hamper their operations in the region. The Partisan movement was so strong, that by late 1943 there were entire regions in occupied Belorussia, where Soviet authority was re-established deep inside the German held territories. Some areas were even secure enough to establish Partisan kolkhozes to grow food and rear livestock for the Partisan groups in their areas. Major Partisan concentrations lay in the areas between Lakes Peipus and Ilmen and straddling the Dno-Nevel and Velikiye Luki-Rezekne railway lines. There were also heavy concentrations in the areas of Novgorod, Leningrad and Pskov.

The Ukraine

The first Ukrainian Partisan detachments appeared in the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. They developed out of Mykola Popudrenko's and Sydir Kovpak's underground groups, but only became a formidable force in 1943, by which stage they were operating throughout occupied Ukraine and numbered over 150,000 fighters. In 1944, Ukrainian partisans led by Kovpak and Petro Vershigora were even able to carry out raids into Romania, Slovakia and Poland.
A separate force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was formed in 1942 as a military arm of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, was engaged in the armed conflict against the Partisans, German forces and the Polish resistance during different stages of the campaign. Although the UPA initially attempted to find a common ground with the German forces against the Partisans, it was soon driven underground as it became apparent that the German view of the Ukraine was as that of a German colony with an enslaved population, not the independent country the UPA was striving to create.

Western Russia

In Western Russia Partisans controlled vast areas of the German rear. The Bryansk-Orel woodlands, the Pripyat Marshes and the White Russian woodlands in the area of Vitebsk, provided ideal operational areas for the Partisan groups. Partisans in the region were led by Alexei Fyodorov, Alexander Saburov, Dmitry Medvedev and others and numbered over 60,000 men. Belgorod, Orel, Kursk and Smolensk regions also maintained significant Partisan activity during the occupation period. In 1943, after the Red Army started to liberate western Russia and northeast Ukraine, many Partisans including units led by Fyodorov, Medvedev and Saburov re-located their operations into central and western Ukraine.

The Baltic States

Partisans also operated in the Baltic States. In Estonia, they were under the leadership of Nikolay Karotamm. In Latvia they were initially under Belorussian command, but from January 1943 they were directly subordinated to the central headquarters in Moscow, under the leadership of Arturs Sprongis. Another prominent commander was the historian Vilis Samsons, head of a unit of 3000 men. In Lithuania, the Partisans had a separate command from November 1942, under Antanas Snieckus. In the Vilnius Ghetto, a resistance organisation named the FPO (Fareinikte Partisaner Organizatzie) was established by Communist and Zionist Partisans and lead by Yitzhak Witenberg and Abba Kovner. In all three Baltic States the largest number of the Soviet Partisans were Russians, Jews and Belorussians. The resistance movement of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians was separate, and generally hostile to the Soviet political system, therefore, only a small number of people of these nationalities joined the cause of the Soviet Partisans.

Partisan Forces

On the 10th of July the Partisan Movement was officially organized and placed under the control of the Tenth Department of the Political Administration of the Army. The groups then in existence were organized into combat Battalions. Comprising from 75 to 150 men, they were to be divided into 2 to 3 companies and the companies into 2 to 3 platoons. Generally they were to operate only at night and from ambush. Their mission was to attack troop columns, camps, transports of fuel and ammunition, headquarters, air bases, and railroad trains previously halted by rail demolitions. Battalion commanders were chosen by the local party councils from among the officer reserve of the Red Army, local leaders with previous military service, or commissars of proven political reliability. Staffs for the Battalions were to be formed in the Jurisdictional Committees and the local Labour Councils.
In addition to the combat battalions, diversionary units were organised. These consisted of from 30 to 50 men each and were sub divided into 5 to 8 groups of 3 to 10 men each. They were to be organized so that the individuals comprising one group would not be acquainted with those of another. The small units were to be concentrated into a larger organization only to control their activity and to facilitate the formation of new groups in the area. Their fundamental mission was sabotage, cutting telephone lines, destroying fuel and ammunition dumps, railroad demolition and carrying out attacks on individual or small groups of enemy vehicles.

German Security Forces

The rear area commands had been specifically charged with maintaining the supply of the field armies and guaranteeing the exploitation of the land for the immediate use of the military. Thus the task of combating the Partisan bands if they threatened the lines of communication and the supply points in the rear fell to them. Nine security Divisions were initially available for this mission, each one comprising an infantry Regiment of three Battalions, a guard Battalion and Landesschuetzen Regiment of from three to four Battalions. Seven of the nine also had an integral motorized police Battalion. Army Group North and Army Group Centre each had a security Regiment of bicycle troops in general reserve while the former had an additional police Regiment. Army Group South also had several satellite security Brigades for commitment in the deep rear and the Carpathian Mountains. As well as the specially formed security Divisions, the Germans also employed native Russian units or 'Orstkommandturen' (OD) and Russian labour volunteers or 'Hiwis' to help guard supply dumps, protecting crops, procuring livestock and providing local knowledge. The security Divisions were often under equipped and poorly trained and in many cases were considerably under strength because of their requirement to provide front line units with replacements. The native units, although invaluable because of their local knowledge, were of an even lower standard and naturally became less reliable as the campaign wore on. Generally, one Division closely followed the main effort of the Army Group, keeping the major communication axis clear of interference, occupying the key population centres along the line of advance and furnishing local protection for the operational headquarters. The others fanned out on either side, occupying the larger towns and cities and covering the roads and railroads feeding the flank armies and the more important lateral links between units. The majority of this work fell to the Landesschuetzen units, patrolling the roads and rail lines and guarding important bridges, supply dumps, while the other Regiments either aided in clearing up the encircled pockets of Red Army personnel or were held as a mobile reserve for any serious insurgent outbreak. The police units concerned themselves with the general maintenance of order and handled traffic on the highways. As German forces pushed further into the Russian interior and the rear areas grew larger, two newly activated security Divisions and several SS Brigades were assigned to the security commands, to provide special protection in critical areas or to curb especially troublesome resistance.
Despite manpower limitations, the security forces were mostly able to contain the offensive actions of the Partisans during the early stages of the campaign. They did this by employing a mainly defensive stance, which was concentrated along major lines of communication and around important installations and areas of supply. They employed a number of tactics to combat the Partisans. Continuous patrolling and occasional large sweeps of Partisan controlled areas, when manpower allowed, forced the Partisan groups to disperse temporarily and disrupted their supply lines. Major rail lines were cleared of all vegetation to a distance of 400m on either side of the track, to make it more difficult for the Partisans to prepare ambushes. A series of fortified blockhouses were constructed at regular intervals, with watchtowers to enable security forces to observe long stretches of track. Those stretches were also vigorously patrolled, but mostly only during daylight hours. Each railroad yard was to be secured by at least one Company and all yards were to have a cleared area at least 300 yards wide around them. Trains often travelled in convoy and within sight of one another and also carried an armed escort on board in case of attack. Another tactic used to protect the locomotive was to place a wagon filled with sand at the front of the train to detonate any explosives. However the Partisans often thwarted this tactic by remotely detonating the explosives under the engine.

Conduct of the Campaign

The Partisan campaign was fought throughout with unremitting ferocity by both sides and life for the civilian population caught in the middle was especially hard.
The early stages of the campaign from mid 1941 to early 1942 saw the German rear area forces treat both the Partisans and civilian population harshly. Several orders issued during the early stages of the campaign helped to fuel the severity of German reaction to the civilian population and the Partisan groups. 'The Barbarossa Order', issued in May 1941, ordered that 'all attempts by enemy civilians to interfere with the smooth running of military operations should be countered with the utmost severity'. It also declared that 'acts committed by Wehrmacht personnel against enemy civilians, even if the act was a military crime, may go unpunished'. The next such order, the infamous 'Commissar Order' issued in June 1941, denied all commissars combatant status and decreed that once captured, they be singled out and immediately shot or else handed over to the SS to suffer the same fate. The final series of instructions, entitled 'Guidelines for the conduct of troops in Russia' was also issued in June 1941. It proclaimed that 'Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National Socialist German people. This battle demands ruthless and energetic measures against Bolshevik agitators, irregulars, saboteurs and Jews and the total eradication of any active or passive resistance'.
Throughout the early stages of the campaign in 1941, the civilian population was terrorized and the destruction of villages and farms, confiscation of livestock and provisions and executions of Partisan sympathisers were common. This alienated the civilian population and lead to increased support for the Partisans.
In early 1942 the German attitude in many areas began to improve. It became clearly apparent, that due to the severe shortage in manpower and the vast size of the areas that security units were tasked to control, that a high level of support would be required from the civilian population in order to contain the activities of the Partisans. The burning of villages was in some cases prohibited, requisitioning of livestock was reduced to a level, which allowed the civilian population to sustain itself. A more lenient attitude was shown to Partisan prisoners and encouragement was given to Partisans wanting to desert.
However in early 1943, when the eventual defeat of German forces in the east became more likely, the civilian population began to become more sympathetic with the Partisans cause. A large upsurge in Partisan activity saw the policy of German security forces take a harsher stance. In an effort to purge areas of Partisan activity, they were turned into dead zones. All villages were destroyed, all livestock confiscated and the civilian population relocated. This was an attempt to deny the Partisan groups of supplies, support and operating bases.
In late 1943 and early 1944 the deteriorating military situation in the east and the increasing levels of organization and effectiveness of the Partisan groups saw the German ability to maintain effective rear area security collapse almost entirely. The Partisan groups could operate almost at will and more regularly in complete cooperation with advancing Red Army units.

The Early Partisan War

At best the early organizational efforts, made in the midst of the wild confusion following the German attack, produced only meagre results. There had been no pre-war planning for Partisan warfare on a national scale and only some scattered preparation locally. Morale was low, training and equipment were poor and recruitment was often forced. The number of desertions was high and when leaders fled or were killed, the groups often fell apart. As well as groups of Partisans formed in rural areas following the German invasion, large groups of Russian soldiers cut off from their units by the rapid German advances, either joined existing groups or formed their own. Despite Stalin's plea in July 1941, there was little early response from the civilian population, however the German programme of repression in the rear areas saw resistance gradually increase. During the early stage of the campaign groups found it difficult to gain the support of the local population who were often unsympathetic to their cause. This limited their ability to operate, gain intelligence and requisition food and supplies.
The first irregular units were few in number and were not overly aggressive, seldom appearing in the more populated areas or near German troop concentrations. They confined their activities to forest and swamp areas where natural cover provided maximum protection and where opposition was lightest. Their attacks were scattered and appeared to conform to no set pattern, the majority being aimed at the more lightly guarded secondary supply links.
In the northern sector, Partisan operations began in mid August and accounted for a large number of demolitions against rail lines in the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus. In the central sector Partisan groups carried out attacks in the area of the Pripyat Marshes and in the marshy forests to the south of Lake Ilmen and the Valdai Hills. In the southern sector, attacks were carried out in the lower edges of the Pripyat along the Korosten-Mozyr line and in the Sarny-Rovno-Kovel area, where the irregulars exerted considerable pressure on the security units. There were also a large number of bridges blown and long sections of track were destroyed. The same was true in the eastern foothills of the Carpathian range and in the marshes along the upper courses of the Bug River.
In mid September, the control and direction of the Partisans was placed under the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. This was a new department, which was to operate independently of both the Red Army and the NKVD, under the direct control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and lead by Marshal Voroshilov. Following this change in control, the Partisan bands began to increase their activity. Some with radios had some limited success in establishing liaison with the Red Army and a few received leaders who had been trained at special Partisan schools in the Soviet rear. The groups never remained in a district in the face of strong opposition and made every effort to avoid direct contact with German forces. If they were dispersed from a particular sector by aggressive German action, they subsequently began raiding in another area, which was less well protected. In general they operated in areas with which they were well acquainted and set up their bases on swamp islands and in deep forests which were difficult to access. They made their marches only by night and over prearranged routes and were armed with Russian or captured German ordnance. Occasionally they received weapons and ammunition by airdrop. They lived off the country, forcibly requisitioning what they needed from the natives. They deliberately attempted to demoralize the local civilians with sudden raids, rumour mongering and terror tactics.
In December 1941, the advent of the Russian counter offensive saw Partisan activity increase. The heaviest pressure remained on the northern wing of the Russian attack, in the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, where the number of rail demolitions steadily increased. In the central sector, the Partisan groups had begun to concentrate their activity around the extensive forests in the Bryansk area. They began hitting the areas railroads, in addition to launching numerous raids on troop units and installations and keeping the natives in the surrounding countryside in a constant state of terror.
As the Red Army continued to press its advantage in the last days of January 1942, the groups in the central sector came more boldly into the picture. They began moving northward out of their forest bases around Bryansk and appearing around Smolensk. Here they joined forces with a number of Red Army parachute units dropped into the same area and were gradually pulled under the provisional command of General Belov. They caused such disruption along the Smolensk-Vyazma rail line and highway, that the Germans were forced to pull out elements of the 5th and 11th Panzer Divisions to right the situation.

The Restructuring Period

In early 1942 the German High Command started to realise the threat that the Partisan groups posed and began to organise a programme of measures to combat them. The first major anti Partisan operation was mounted between the 26th of March and the 6th of April, in the area of Glusk-Paritschi-Oktjabrski to the south of Bobruisk. Named operation 'Bamberg', it involved Police Battalion 325 and the 707th Infantry Division, but only resulted in dispersing the local groups into other areas. Two other operations that took place in the same month were 'Munich' and 'Hanover'. They were conducted in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area and involved the 221st Security Division. The operations were largely a failure due to a lack of manpower, fuel shortages and appalling weather conditions and strong Partisan counter attacks inflicted heavy casualties on the Division.
In May 1942 STAVKA established a central committee to reorganize Partisan forces and coordinate their operations to support those of the Red Army. Advisors, political officers and demolition, intelligence and communication specialists were provided to train and help coordinate Partisan formations. Weapons, ammunition, communications equipment and medical supplies were air dropped and in some areas strongly controlled by the Partisans, temporary airstrips were established. The loose concentrations of groups were gradually pulled together into tightly controlled commands, with individual units assigned specific areas as bases of operations. Units composed exclusively of irregulars were integrated into groups similar to a Brigade, numbering as many as 1500 men. The strength of the individual units comprising these, varied from 30 to 300 men, depending on the personality and leadership qualities of their commanders. Commissars sent from the rear exercised political control. The personnel were given some training and for the most part were adequately armed. The brigades and groups were normally designated by the names of Russian heroes past or present, or by the geographical area in which they operated. The lower echelon units were generally known by the names of their respective commanders. The groups were to lend tactical aid to the Red Army as fighting units, gather information of tactical value and continually attack the German lines of communication.
In May, prior to the commencement of the German summer offensives, Partisan activity increased considerably in all areas. However the open terrain that the German forces were advancing over did not suit Partisan operations and the effects were minimal. The restructuring of the Partisan forces continued and by the summer of 1942, all the larger groups were well armed and supplied with ammunition. Their materiel included light mortars, light and heavy machine guns and some of the groups had antitank guns, a few had motor vehicles, and several operated reconnaissance cars.
On the 5th of June army group Centre launched a large-scale antipartisan operation, code-named 'Vogelsang', in the area of Bryansk, to clear the forests of Partisans and scattered Red Army units and to secure the rail lines and highways. Despite the reasonable success of the operation, the bulk of the partisans withdrew from the area to the west.
It wasn't until October 1942, that the first large scale Partisan operations took place. On the 13th of October a large Partisan unit struck the north-south railroad between Bryansk and Dmitryev and virtually destroyed an entire 12 mile section. After they had removed some miles of telephone line, the irregulars simultaneously attacked all guard details along the stretch and blew the tracks at 178 different points. Despite the fact that Partisan actions against German military targets were having limited effect, the groups were having a serious impact on the economic infrastructure. Collective farms and the timber industry were particularly hard hit.

The Rail War

The 'Rail War' began in earnest in May 1943. As German preparations for operation Citadel began, STAVKA initiated a campaign of disruption across the entire front targeted against the German rear areas and along key road and rail routes.
In the northern sector, the Velikiye Luki-Rezekne and Vitebsk-Dvinsk rail lines were attacked by Partisan forces numbering some 11,000 men and the Brest Litovsk-Smolensk line by a force of approximately 8000. The largest number of attacks were carried out in the centre of the front. The Roslavl-Bryansk, Bryansk-Lgov and Bryansk-Gomel rail lines were attacked by three Partisan groups, each numbering some 6000 men. A group of seven temporary bridges across the Desna River, to the south of Bryansk, were also targeted. The Minsk-Gomel line, which ran along the eastern edge of the Pripyat Marshes, was also attacked by a force of 10,000. In the southern sector, the Kursk-Kiev rail line was targeted by a force of approximately 8000 men. However the terrain here was unsuitable for Partisan operations and attacks were not as prolific.
In an effort to halt the attacks in the Bryansk area, a series of five anti Partisan operations were mounted in late May and early June. Operations 'Zigennebaron' and 'Tannhaeuser', which utilized three infantry Divisions, two panzer Divisions, a Hungarian light Division and a number of security, Ost and Volkswehr units, were carried out to the south and southwest of Bryansk, while Operation 'Nachbarhilfe', which utilized the 221st Security Division and Ost and Volkswehr units, cleared an area to the west. Operation 'Freischutze', which utilized the 6th Infantry and 5th Panzer Divisions to the north and the smaller operation 'Osterie' to the east. The operations were reasonably successful, in that the Partisan groups in the areas were temporarily dispersed and separated from their supplies. However because none of the groups were destroyed, they simply reformed following the conclusion of the German operations and gradually resumed their attacks. Another operation mounted during June was 'Cottbus'. The operation was carried out in the Lepel, Begomel, Ushatshi area by a mixed force of Army, SS, SD and native volunteer units and became infamous for the brutality and ferocity, which the German forces employed, both against the Partisans and the local population.
After the failure of operation Citadel, Russian forces launched a series of offensives forcing the Germans onto the defensive. In July the position in the Bryansk-Orel salient became untenable and German forces began to withdraw westwards over the Desna River. At this time Partisan action increased considerably in an effort to disrupt the withdrawal. The Bryansk-Konotop rail line was attacked so heavily that it was completely closed from the 22nd to the 24th of July. In July alone, in the Bryansk area, Partisan forces carried out over 1000 rail demolitions, 30 bridge demolitions and almost 400 raids on various other targets. In the southern sector during July, as German forces were forced gradually westwards, many of the Partisan groups east of the Dnepr River began to gradually move into the lower Pripyat marshes. Also at about this time, began the emergence of Ukrainian Nationalist groups who openly engaged Russian Partisan forces in the area.
On the nights of August the 2nd and 3rd, a simultaneous series of attacks were made which resulted in over 8000 rail demolitions in the Bryansk-Smolensk area. Partisan groups also carried out raids against a variety of railway facilities, placing an additional strain on the network and its infrastructure. In the Pripyat area, roads, road convoys and communication centres were also heavily attacked.
During September there was an early lull in the attacks, however on the 18th, Partisan forces resumed large scale attacks, mainly against railway targets, carrying out over 1200 demolitions during the month in the Pripyat area.
By the beginning of October German forces had completed their withdrawal to the Dnepr and the Partisan attacks began to recede. Partisan forces in the central sector carried out 5290 rail demolitions, 56 bridge demolitions and 900 separate raids. During the same month, Partisan groups first became active to the west of Brest Litovsk, in the areas of Lida and Vilna.
During November and December, Partisan activity declined considerably. The groups concentrated on consolidating the areas they held, constructing more permanent operating bases and improving supply lines and carrying out training. At the same time STAVKA increased its control over the groups, replacing commanders with regular, combat experienced Red Army commanders, improving regional and central command structures and improving links between Partisan groups and regular Red Army forces in order to link their operations more closely to those of the Army.
In January, Partisan forces in the northern sector carried out a series of operations in support of the Red Army's offensive to free Leningrad. They targeted specific areas of the German lines of communication, including the Dvinsk-Leningrad rail line and highway, the Dno-Soltsy-Leningrad rail line and major rail links in the Novgorod and Volkhov areas. They were also tasked with hampering the German withdrawal and providing protection to the Army's exposed left flank. On the evening of the 16th of January, a large band struck a railroad station 20 miles north of Luga and this attack was followed on the nights of the 17th and 18th by a general assault on all rail lines in the sector and by open attacks on security strong points and garrisons. The Dno-Soltsy-Leningrad line was blown in more than 300 places, while the Pskov-Luga line was broken in 157 places. More demolitions followed in the next 24 hours, and repair operations were repeatedly interrupted by attacks on repair crews. By noon of the 20th the Dno-Soltsy line was almost completely paralysed.
In April 1944, German forces in the central sector mounted a series of large anti partisan operations, from April the 11th until the 23rd of June, against groups concentrated in the areas west of Vitebsk and Orsha. The first operation, 'Regenschauer', utilized elements of the 3rd Panzer Army, which attacked westward down the left bank of the Dvina River, into the lake region just south of Polotsk. Contrary to expectations, the Partisans there, caught by surprise and mistakenly believing that the Germans would withdraw after the operation, pulled back across the lake line and into the depths of the Ushachi area with hardly a fight, despite orders to the contrary. The attacking force consolidated its gains and dug in. This operation was followed almost immediately by 'Fruhlingsfest', and involved the units which had executed 'Regenschauer', remaining in place along the lakes as a blocking force, joined in the north and west by elements of the 16th Army. Additional elements of the 3rd Panzer Army and a large force of Police and SS units drove into the area as the hammer against the anvil of the blocking line. When the attack groups were joined by elements of the 95th Infantry Division, the pressure became too heavy, and the Partisans began a series of attempts to break out to the south. The operations resulted in heavy casualties and considerable disruption of the Partisan networks. The final operation, 'Kormoran', was carried out in the area of Borisov, Minsk and Molodechno. The operation utilized elements of the 3rd Panzer Army striking westward through the Senno area, and police and SS units attacking to the east and northeast from the vicinity of Molodechno. To prevent a mass escape of bands to the north and south, additional elements of the 3rd Panzer Army had set up a blocking line on the northern fringe of the region while Police and SS units had established similar positions along the rail lines to the south and southwest. Again the operation was reasonably successful, but had to be ended before its conclusion due to the commencement of operation Bagration.
During June, air supplies to Partisan groups in the central sector was stepped up considerably in preparation for the large Russian offensive, operation Bagration. On the night of the 19th of June Partisan forces opened the preparation for the Russian offensive with their greatest single blow of the war against the German lines of communication. They launched large scale attacks across the sector, carrying out 9600 rail demolitions and raids against German held villages and supply depots. They carried out a further 892 rail demolitions the following night, with the Minsk-Orsha and Mogilev-Vitebsk rail lines being hit particularly hard and almost completely paralysed for several days. As the offensive swept through their concentration areas, the Partisans worked in close cooperation with the regular units. For the most part they held their formations and hit at their targets with a good degree of precision. In a number of instances they were identified fighting in the line as units under direct Red Army control. As the advance neared the Polish border, the units slowly fell apart. Many were absorbed into the line Divisions, while others broke off in small groups in an effort to avoid induction into the Regular Army.