Fedor von Bock

The Early Years

Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock was born in 1880 in the city of Küstrin. Born into a family with a long military heritage, at the age of 8, von Bock was sent to Berlin to study at the Potsdam and Gross Lichterfelde Military Academy, where he quickly became adept in academic subjects and learned to speak fluent French, and to a fair degree, English and Russian. Due to the influence of his family, von Bock also developed an unquestioned loyalty to the state and dedication to the military profession. At the age of 17, von Bock became an officer candidate in the Imperial Foot Guards Regiment at Potsdam, recieving an officer's commission a year later.
The tall, thin, narrow-shouldered von Bock, was described as being arrogant, ambitious, and opinionated. He approached military bearing with an unbending demeanor and while not a brilliant theoretician, he was a highly determined officer. He quickly earned the nickname 'Holy Fire of Küstrin', on one occaision telling his troops, 'The ideal soldier fulfills his duty to the utmost, obeys without even thinking, thinks only when ordered to do so and has as his only desire to die the honorable death of a soldier killed in action.'
In 1906, von Bock attended the War Academy in Berlin and after a year's study, he joined the ranks of the General Staff. He soon joined the Patriotic Army League and become a close associate of other prominent young German officers, such as von Brauchitsch, Halder and von Rundstedt. In 1908, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant.
By the beginning of WW1, von Bock had been promoted to the rank of Captain and was assigned as a Divisional staff officer in von Rupprecht's Army Group on the Western Front. Not content with a staff role, von Bock sought a front line post and transferred to the 4th Prussian Foot Guards. He commanded a Battalion, showing great gallantry during the fighting on the Somme and at Cambrai. For his actions, he won Germany's highest award for gallantry, the Pour le Mèrite. His lust for action earned him the nickname 'Der Sterber'.
Following the end of WW1, von Bock stayed on as an officer of the post-treaty German Army and rose rapidly through the ranks. From 1920 to 1923, he served as Chief of Staff to the 3rd Military District in Berlin and in 1924 was given command of an infantry Battallion in Infantry Regiment 4 at Kolberg. In 1928, von Bock was promoted to Major General and appointed commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. In 1930, he took command of the 1st Infantry Division and from 1931 to 1934, he commanded the 2nd Military District at Stettin. In 1935, von Bock was appointed as commander of the 3rd Army Group at Dresden, following his promotion to the rank of General of Infantry. It was during his time in this role that he came to know Kesselring, with whom he would cooperate so successfully later in his career. During this time, Bock and Kesselring closely studied the art of air/army cooperation and formed a close mutual respect for each other. In 1938, von Bock, in cooperation with Reichenau, organized the invasion of Austria and then commanded German forces there throughout the operation.
In August 1939, Bock was given command of Army Group North in preparation for the invasion of Poland, with the objective of destroying Polish forces north of the Weichsel River. Army Group North was composed of the 3rd and 4th Armies, which struck southward from East Prussia and then eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor. During the campaign, von Bock's forces were closely supported by Kesselring's 1st Air Fleet.
Following the success in Poland, von Bock returned to Berlin to begin preparations for the coming campaign in the West. In October 1939, von Bock was given command of Army Group B, consisting of the 18th and 6th Armies and was tasked with advancing through the Low Countries and luring the northern units of the Allied armies into a pocket.
The 18th Army's campaign in Holland lasted only five days, with Dutch forces surrendering on the 14th of May. The 6th Army's campaign got off to a difficult start, with heavy fighting against the British 3rd Division at Louvain. However, events further south saw the B.E.F and Belgian forces withdrawing rapidly southwards. Bock's forces then saw further heavy fighting at Audenarde on the 21st of May and along the Lys River on the 27th. The same day, Belgian forces surrendered.
When the German offensive resumed on the 5th of June, von Bock's Army Group crossed the Seine River on the 12th and two days later elements of the 18th Army secured the surrender of Paris.
On July the 18th, von Bock was promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal during a reception held by Adolf Hitler. For much of the summer of 1940 von Bock alternated his time between his headquarters in Paris and his home in Berlin. At the end of August, von Bock transferred his headquarters to East Prussia. Between September and November von Bock suffered a period of ill health and his command was briefly taken over by General Wilhelm List. On the 3rd of December, von Bock was visited by Hitler who offered him congratulations on reaching his 60th birthday. During the meeting, Hitler told Bock of the plan to invade Russia and told him that during the coming campaign, 'it will be necessary to eradicate the Soviet Union from the face of the earth.' Bock recorded in his diary that he was surprised by this daunting piece of news and told the Fuhrer, 'the enormity of Russia's terrain and its untested military strength will make this a difficult task, even for Germany's powerful forces.' His reaction naturally displeased Hitler, who also informed him he would have a crucial role to play in the invasion. In January 1941, Bock and von Salmuth carried out a study which proposed that Leningrad should be bypassed and that his Army Group should destroy as many Russian forces as possible along the central axis and that Moscow should be the predominant objective.
In preparation for Operation Barbarossa, on April 1st 1941, Army Group B was re-designated as Army Group Center and moved to the Warsaw area. It consisted of the 4th and 9th Armies, the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups and the 2nd Air Fleet.

Barbarossa Begins

Bock prized highly the traditional values of the soldier and would have nothing to do with the infamous 'commissar order'. Niether would he circulate any order, which he considered detrimental to good discipline amongst his troops. In the occupied areas he encouraged a liberal attitude to the civilian population in order to gain their support. The main task of Army Group Center was to drive towards the cities of Minsk and Smolensk and in great encirclements, destroy the Russian Armies grouped there.
On the first day of the campaign, elements of the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Bug River and bypassed the city of Brest-Litovsk. The spearhed of the 3rd Panzer Group was heading for Grodno on the Nieman River in order to seize the important river crossings there. Leading elements from the 4th and 9th Armies had already crossed the Bug and Desna Rivers.
Later that day, von Bock flew from his headquarters in Posen, to an advanced airfield near the headquarters of the 13th Infantry Corps. There, Lieutenant General Erich Jaschke gave von Bock a summary of the days progress. Following this meeting, von Bock visited Guderian's forward command post at Bokhaly. Guderian's Chief of staff Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein greeted von Bock, as Guderian had already crossed the Bug River several hours earlier with the 18th Panzer Division. Von Bock then visited Joachim Lemelsen, who gave an agitated report from the front. The roads on the Russian side of the Bug River were already becoming too soft to support the weight of the tanks. As a result, several tank columns had to be rerouted to cross a bridge farther south at Koden. This rerouting caused severe traffic congestion, as the vehicles converged on this single crossing. Despite this, the first day of the invasion had been spectacularly successful. Russian resistance was reported as being light and complete surprise was achieved. All along the front rapid progress was being made.
On the 23rd, von Bock crossed the Bug River and escorted by Major General Gustav Schmidt, he made his way to a Company command post from where he observed German artillery firing on Russian positions near Brest-Litovsk. Despite the fact that German panzers had already crossed deep into Russian territory, the defenders of the city were holding out stubbornly. Later that day von Bock was presented with reports that Russian resistance was stiffening all along the front, especially on the southern flank of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. Meanwhile, Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group was advancing with greater ease through the Baltic states and White Russia.
Hoth's armies advanced so quickly that von Bock immediately contacted Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in favour of attacking toward Vitebsk, so that a drive could be made for Moscow. Initially, Brauchitsch accepted the plan, but it was quickly overruled by Hitler, who favoured the encirclement and destruction of the large Russian armies near Minsk. Bock was incensed, and wrote in his diary, 'the envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next natural objective and will concentrate defence forces there.' Differences between von Bock and the High Command repeatedly surfaced. He continued to favour a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing the Russian armies and leaving them to be destroyed by the following infantry forces. He argued that if encirclement was truly necessary, then instead of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy smaller Russian forces, a larger encirclement should be made further eastward toward the Dvina-Dnepr River basins. Hitler decided against this plan and insisted that the enemy pockets must be destroyed before advancing deeper into Russia. Von Bock, enraged by this decision, wrote in his diary, 'we are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape us by the restrictions placed on our armour!'
He hesitantly gave the order to abandon the drive toward Vitebsk and assist in the destruction of the pockets. On the 25th of June, von Bock moved his headquarters from Posen to Kobryn, a town about fifteen miles northeast of Brest-Litovsk. On the 30th of June, the 4th and 9th Armies met each other near Slonim, closing a large pocket. Von Bock soon gave the order to disengage from the encirclement and prepare for a full-scale drive to the east. This order once again caused a confrontation between von Bock and Brauchitsch.
On July 3rd, von Bock's forces were once again advancing eastward, with Guderian's tanks crossing the Beresina and Hoth's crossing the Duna. This day marked the furthest distance covered by von Bock's troops in a single day, with over 100 miles traveled. Four days later, Guderian's tanks crossed the Dnepr River, the last great obstacle before Smolensk. However, Guderian was ordered by von Kluge to withdraw back across the river and berated for making an unauthorized crossing. Von Bock intervened and reversed this order, telling Guderian to re-cross the river. Von Bock protested about von Kluge's actions to High Command, but to no avail. On July the 11th, von Bock moved his headquarters again to Borisov, a Russian town near the Beresina River.
On the 16th of July, Smolensk was captured and by the 20th of July elements of the 2nd Panzer Group had reached the Yelnia bend of the Desna River, only 185 miles from Moscow. On the 23rd of August, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Halder, held a conference at Bock's HQ at Borisov. Also in attendance were von Kluge, Strauss, von Weichs and Guderian. Halder informed the group that Hitler had decided against an immediate drive on Moscow, and that the focus would now be on the Ukraine and the Crimea. Army Group Center was to stay on the defensive and to transfer Guderian's Panzer Group to Army Group South.
Von Bock made a heated telephone call to Brauchitsch to protest against the transfer of forces to Army Group South, telling him, 'every hour that we lose is irretrievable. We are permitting the enemy the time he needs to recover, to slip from the noose we have placed upon him!' Despite his protestations, the attack shifted southwards and Army Group Center remained on the defensive until the end of September.

Operation Typhoon

As part of the preparation for Operation Typhoon, Army Group Center would be heavily reinforced and would consist of the 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies. Von Bock spent most of the remainder of September on inspection tours of his reinforced Army Group and on one occasion, accompanied by Kesselring, flew over Moscow. Before the operation opened, he issued a rousing order of the day stating, 'Soldiers of Army Group Center. After weeks of waiting, the Army Group renews the attack! Our objectives are none other than the destruction of the remaining enemy forces to the east of us and the capture of the citadel of Bolshevism, Moscow!'
Operation Typhoon opened on the 30th of September and almost immediately, von Bock's forces encountered stiff Russian resistance. The delay between the summer battles and the resumption of the drive on Moscow, had allowed the Russians to reinforce the area between Smolensk and Moscow with the 3rd, 10th, 13th, and 20th Armies.
The 2nd Panzer Army, attacked towards the important rail centers of Orel and Bryansk, while the 4th Panzer Army moved across the Desna River and the 3rd Panzer Army struck toward Rshev on the Volga River.
On October the 3rd, elements of the 2nd Panzer Army captured Orel and subsequently gained access to a paved highway which led to Moscow, some 180 miles away. Other elements of the 2nd Panzer Army reported that they had bypassed Bryansk and were heading toward Kuraschev. Von Bock ordered them to press on toward Tula, but within hours this order had been countermanded by the High Command, which called for an attack against Bryansk. The town was captured by elements of the 17th Panzer Division on the 6th of October, as was Vyazma the following day by elements of the 4th Panzer Army.
On the 9th of October the rainy season opened and the advance rapidly ground to a halt. The poor ground conditions also exacerbated the deteriorating supply situation and Russian resistance continued to stiffen. Slight improvements in the weather soon made it possible for von Bock's forces to continue to seal the pockets around Bryansk and Vyazma. The following infantry forces were left to reduce the pockets and this was completed by the 17th of October.
On the 19th of October, following heavy fighting, elements of the 3rd Panzer army captured Mozhaysk, only sixty miles from the Russian capital. On the 28th, elements of the second Panzer Army reached Tula, to the south of Moscow, but ran into fierce Russian resistance.
As November arrived temperatures dropped rapidly. The Army Group spent the first two weeks of November refitting and the attack wasn't renewed until the 19th. On November 20th, von Bock moved his field headquarters to an advanced forward position near the front lines. There he visited an artillery command post, where he could see the buildings of Moscow through his field glasses. Several days later, German forces crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal and reached Khimki, but soon fell back due to stiff Russian resistance. On November 29th, elements of the 4th Panzer Army reached the western suburbs of Moscow and on December the 4th, units of the 2nd Army reached Kuntsevo, a southern suburb of Moscow. Elements of the 2nd Panzer Army bypassed Kolomna and reached the Moscow River, although they failed to capture Tula which was fiercly defended by elements of the 50th Army. Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Army once again fought into Khimki, but by the 5th of December, most of the units along the attack front had gone over to the defensive.
On December the 6th, Russian forces along the whole front launched their winter counter offensive. German forces began to retreat, destroying whatever equipment they could not salvage. Several days later, High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations. Von Bock wrote in his diary, 'my troops have given all they have, they can do no more. Their supreme efforts are reflected in the shockingly high losses among both commanders and men. All along, I demanded of Army High Command the authority to strike down the enemy when he was wobbling. We could have finished the enemy last summer, we could have destroyed him completely. Last August, the road to Moscow was open. We could have entered the Bolshevik capital in triumph and in summery weather. The high military leadership of the Fatherland made a terrible mistake when it forced my army group to adopt a position of defence last August. Now all of us are paying for that mistake.' However, despite the shortcomings of the High Command, von Bock must share some of the blame for the suffering of his Army Group. Whether he was too obstinate to force a change, or vanity clouded his judgement, he failed to call a showdown with Hitler that common sense must have dictated. By December the 13th, German forces had retreated more than fifty miles from the capital and on December the 18th, von Bock was relieved of his command, officially on grounds of ill health, partially true as he was suffering from a long term stomach ailment. He returned to Berlin and was placed at the Fuhrer's disposal.

A Second Chance

In January 1942, following Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau's death from a sudden heart attack, he was given command of Army Group South, which was fighting defensive battles in the Crimea and the Kharkov area. In April he oversaw the partial destruction of the Southwestern Front in the Barvenkovo salient to the east of Kharkov. Following this success, in May, 11th Army's Crimean offensive began. In just two weeks the Kerch Peninsula had been reached and Kerch itself captured. On the 3rd of July, Russian forces in Sevastopol surrendered and the offensive ended.
His attention now turned to the capture of Voronezh, in southwestern Russia. The city was captured on the 5th of July, but the Russians retaliated with strong counter attacks. Von Bock committed additional forces to try and hold the city, but this infuriated Hitler, who ordered their immediate withdrawl. However, von Bock chose to ignore the order and continued the action. This resulted in a series of unpleasant altercations between von Bock and Hitler, during which the Fuhrer openly criticised his handling of the operation. On the 7th of July, von Bock was relived of his command, again on grounds of poor health. Bock was stunned and argued in vain against the decision. On the 15th of July he returned to Berlin, but despite his fall from grace, such was his level of prestige in Germany, the pretence that he was still commanding forces on the eastern front was retained for several months, with photo's of him from the previous summer still being published in German newspapers. Bock became embittered and considered that he had been made a scapegoat. During his time in retirement, he was approached, not for the first time, by members of the conspiracy to overthrow Hitler. Although he detested national socialism, he was never willing to lift a hand against Hitler and so declined to become involved, although he never betrayed the conspiritors.

The End for 'Der Sterber'

With the Russians closing in on Berlin in 1945, Bock was informed by Manstein that Admiral Donitz was forming a new government in Hamburg. Bock travelled to the city, perhaps hoping for a new command. On the 2nd of May 1945, only a week before the war's end in Europe, Bock's car was strafed on the Kiel road by a British fighter-bomber. He was killed along with his wife and daughter. At age 64, Fedor von Bock became the only one of Hitler's Field Marshals to die from enemy fire.