Operation Uranus

Situation

In October 1942, German forces had reached the Volga and were invested in the siege of Stalingrad, with the German 6th Army engaged in heavy fighting for the city. Outside the city, German forces and their axis allies were over stretched, poorly equipped, especially with regards to adequate armored forces and anti tank weapons, with many units under strength and low in moral.
On the northern flank of 6th Army, the Romanian 3rd Army defended a front 138km long, between Lugovsky and Sukhoy Donetsk. The Army consisted of the 4th Corps, comprised of the 1st Cavalry and 13th Infantry Divisions, the 5th Corps, comprised of the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Corps, consisting of the 9th and 14th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Corps formed from the 7th and 11th Infantry Divisions, in a single echelon, from west to east. The Army also had in reserve the 7th Cavalry and 15th Infantry Divisions. In November it was bolstered with the addition of the German 48th Panzer Corps, comprised of the German 22nd Panzer and 1st Romanian Armored Division. It also had attached the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Motorized Heavy Artillery Regiments and the 41st Independent Motorized heavy Artillery Battalion.
On the southern flank were the forces of the Romanian 4th Army and elements of the German 4th Panzer Army. The Romanian 4th Army occupied a front almost 270km in length, between Straya Otrada and Sarpa. It was comprised of the 6th Corps, formed from the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 18th and 20th Infantry Divisions and the 7th Corps, comprised of the 5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions. The only major formation available to 4th Panzer Army was the 16th Motorized Division in the Yelista area, well to the south of the city, between the Manych and Sal Rivers.
STAVKA had begun planning in mid September to mount an offensive against the weak flanks of 6th Army and then to encircle it within the city. The 62nd Army, fighting in Stalingrad, had been fed sufficient reinforcements to tie down the German assault, while STAVKA had gradually built up forces for offensive to the north and south of the city.
To the north, the 5th Tank Army would attack south from its bridgehead on the Don at Serafimovich. Further east the 21st Army would do the same to the south of the Don at Kletskaya, attacking the rear of the 11th Army Corps in the Don bend.
In the south, the 64th Army would attack to the south of Beketovka and advance towards the Don crossings at Kalach, where it would link with the northern force, completing the encirclement. Further south, the 57th Army would attack from the area of the great lakes of Sarpa and Tsatsa.
This would be the first major operation where the Russians employed a considerable element of maskirovka to mask their intentions. Radio security was tightened and orders were given verbally instead of in written form. Units along the attacking sectors were ordered to construct defensive positions for the benefit of German aerial reconnaissance. All troop movements into the assembly areas were made at night under strict march discipline. The Voronezh Front, further to the north, underwent preparations for an offensive, in order to mask Russian intentions in the Stalingrad area.

The Northern Pincer

The offensive opened in the northern sector on the morning of the 19th of November. At 05:30 a telephone call to 6th Army HQ stated that trumpet calls from the Russian lines were signaling the opening of an artillery bombardment. The bombardment, from some 3500 guns and Katyusha's, could be heard over 30 miles away. Despite a heavy fog, the guns, which had ranged in during the previous days, wrought havoc on the forward positions of the Romanian lines. Following the hour-long artillery preparation the infantry Divisions began to move forward. As they did so the gun batteries increased their range to fire against the Romanian second line and artillery positions. Despite the heavy artillery bombardment the Romanian troops, in some sectors, stood up to the initial Russian attacks. However once the Russians employed their armor, the poorly equipped Romanians had little choice but to yield ground. By midday, the Russian 4th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, had smashed through the lines of the Romanian 4th Corps, at the junction of the 13th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions in the area of Kletskaya.
Later in the day, the 5th Tank Army's 1st Tank Corps also broke through the lines of the Romanian 2nd Corps 14th Infantry Division, further west at Bolshoy. The 8th Cavalry Corps followed and widened the breach, advancing south towards the Chir River, whilst also protecting the open right flank of the 5th Tank Army. The 26th Tank Corps was also introduced through the breach, advancing southwest towards Perelazovsky.
Russian forces also mounted attacks west of the Sarisa Valley against the 5th Infantry Division and at Raspopinskaya against the 6th Infantry Division, but these attacks were repulsed. During the morning, as the poor weather lifted, some Russian aircraft took off to provide support to the ground forces. The commander of the Luftwaffe's 8th Air Corps wrote, 'Once again, the Russians have made masterly use of the bad weather'.
Despite all of Paulus's complaints to the German high command about his overstretched lines of supply, weak flank protection and continued reports of a build up of Russian forces along the Don River, no effort had been made to prepare for such an eventuality and to improve 6th Army's chance of survival. The Army itself had also done nothing to prepare for such an eventuality. Despite all the warnings from the Romanian forces over the previous weeks, Von Paulus, 6th Army's commander, had made no effort to withdraw his panzer forces from the city to provide a mobile reserve with which to meet the Russian offensive. Neither had there had been any move to redistribute supply and ammunition dumps with which to supply such a mobile reserve. Neither had any redistribution been made of units within the city, to protect the open flanks or the threatened crossings at Kalach.
At 09:45, 6th Army HQ was made aware that the offensive had begun. Despite the reports from the Romanian forces, now fighting for their lives, the Army HQ was painfully slow to react to the threat and it was over two hours later before the 48th Panzer Corps was given orders to move north towards Bolshoy. The 48th Panzer Corps however, was severely under strength and totally incapable of halting the Russian onslaught. Its 14th Panzer Division, which had suffered heavy losses in the fighting during the approach to Stalingrad, had not been given time to refit. The 22nd Panzer Division, during a long period of immobility, was starved of fuel and had few serviceable tanks. The Romanian 1st Panzer Division was only equipped with Skoda light tanks, which were no match for the Russian vehicles facing it. The 1st Romanian Panzer Division was diverted on route and a surprise Russian attack caught its Divisional HQ, destroying the only serviceable radio sets. By that evening, the Division had reached Sirkovsky, but all contact with it was lost for several days following the loss of its radio equipment. In the city itself, 6th Army's HQ again failed to react and extricate its panzer forces from the costly street fighting.
In the late afternoon, the Russian 1st Tank Corps finally encountered the 22nd Panzer Division. In the growing darkness a chaotic tank battle took place near Petshany.
At 17:00, already hopelessly late, elements of the German 11th Corps were ordered to establish a new defensive line to protect the rear of 6th Army. This required the German 376th and 44th Infantry Divisions to deploy to the south and face westwards. As they attempted to do so, elements of the 65th Army mounted attacks to prevent them from disengaging and to make matters worse the 4th Tank Corps had already broken into their rear areas and was heading for the Don River.
Finally at 18:00, elements of the 24th Panzer Division were ordered to extricate themselves from the fighting in the city and move towards the Don crossings at Peskovatka and Vertyachy. This proved extremely difficult as the 62nd Army in Stalingrad launched strong attacks to prevent German forces from disengaging. At 22:00, finally realizing the magnitude of the situation, Army Group B issued orders to halt offensive action within the city. They read, 'Change of situation in area of 3rd Rumanian Army compels radical measures, with the objective of moving forces as rapidly as possible to cover the rear flank of 6th Army and secure lines of communication. All offensive activities in Stalingrad are to be halted with immediate effect!' The 16th Panzer Division was also ordered to extract itself from fighting in the Rynok area and move west towards the Don. The Division was forced to replenish with fuel from reserve depots on route, due to the lack of fuel in the area of the city.
On the morning of the 20th, the 22nd Panzer Division, overwhelmed at Petshany, withdrew to the north of Bol Donschynka. The 1st Romanian Panzer Division, despite its lack of communications, tried to advance towards Petshany in order to link up with the 22nd Panzer Division, but was forced to stop west of Korotovsky by stiff Russian resistance and numerous counterattacks. Meanwhile, the Russian armoured formations of the 26th and 4th Tank Corps, flowing between the two Divisions, occupied the Varlamovsky and Perelasovsky villages, thus encircling the remnants of the Romanian 5th Corps. During the afternoon, in the 4th Corps sector, a Russian armoured force also attacked the 15th Infantry Division. The Romanian unit suffered heavy losses but managed to offer continued resistance and by evening the Russian forces withdrew. In the 2nd Corps sector, the Romanian 7th Cavalry Division, tried unsuccessfully to block the advance of the Russian 8th Cavalry Corps. The right wing of the division, which had received the main blow, was forced to retreat to the south, while the left wing was reassigned to the 9th Infantry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division was also forced to retreat towards Stalingrad and the remnants were subordinated to the German 6th Army.
By the end of the day, Russian forces had opened a 70km wide gap in the centre of 3rd Army's front and managed to encircle a group of some 40,000 men. The group was re-designated the 'Lascar Group' and consisted of the remnants of the Romanian 1st Panzer and 5th, 6th, 13th, 14th and 15th Infantry Divisions.
On the 21st of November, the 22nd Panzer Division tried to advance towards Perelasovsky in order to link up with the Romanian 1st Panzer Division and to relieve the 'Lascar Group', but it was halted on the 22nd of November between Bol Donschynka and Perelasovsky. The 1st Romanian Panzer Division advanced slowly against fierce Russian resistance, towards Bol. Donschynka, but it too was halted. Lacking fuel, ammunition and food, it was re-supplied by aircraft of the Luftwaffe, which flew in the badly needed supplies on an improvised airfield. The Romanian unit then headed south and after heavy fighting between the Sarisa and Surkan valleys, it crossed to the western bank of the River Chir on the 25th. The German 11th Corps to the west of the Don were compelled to withdraw back towards the river as the 3rd Guards Cavalry and 4th Mechanized Corps exploited the gaps in the defensive line they had attempted to form and roamed at will in their rear areas.
In the early hours of the 22nd of November, a small detachment of the 26th Tank Corps, approached the lightly guarded bridge at Kalach, in a small convoy of captured vehicles, with their lights switched on to avoid suspicion. They opened fire as they drove onto the bridge, and cleared the way for the leading Brigade to begin crossing to the eastern bank. By mid morning Russian infantry had broken into the town and the German garrison began withdrawing eastwards towards Stalingrad.
Later in the day, the remnants of the 'Lascar Group' attempted to break out of its pocket. The 15th Infantry Division broke through to the southwest towards Bol Dosnchynka, while the 6th Infantry Division continued to retreat towards Petshany. However, during the night, Russian forces took control of Golovsky, General Lascar was captured and the column was split in half. The few units that reached Bol Donschynka, managed to link up with the 22nd Panzer Division and formed defensive positions around Chernashevskaya. That night, the remnants of the 376th Infantry Division withdrew to the eastern bank of the Don over the bridge at Vertyachy.
On the morning of the 24th, Russian forces renewed their attack and the Romanian units were forced to withdraw once again, crossing the River Chir with the remnants of the 22nd Panzer Division on the 26th.
On the night of the 26th, the remnants of the 16th Panzer and 44th Infantry Divisions were among the last units to cross to the eastern bank of the Don, via the last open bridge at Luchinsky, which was demolished at 03:30 on the morning of the 27th, sealing shut the last avenue of escape for the forces trapped in the pocket.

The Southern Pincer

On the morning of the 20th of November, Russian forces of the Stalingrad Front opened the southern offensive. Poor weather delayed the opening of the artillery barrage until 10:00 and after the forty-five minute preparation was complete, the infantry Divisions of the 64th and 57th Armies moved into the attack. Further south the 4th Mechanized and 4th Cavalry Corps spearheaded the advance of the 51st Army from the area of lakes Sarpa and Tatsa.
The principal shock was received by the Romanian 6th Corps, in the sectors of the 20th, 2nd, 18th and 1st Infantry Divisions. Here the 57th Army attacked in a northwesterly direction towards Sovietsky, where tanks of the 13th Tank Brigade broke through the lines of the 20th Romanian Division and advanced towards Saty. Further south, the 51st Army attacked in an easterly direction towards Kotelnikovsky, where a breakthrough was achieved at the junction of the Romanian 1st and 18th Infantry Divisions. Here, the Russians moved the 4th Mechanized Corps towards Plodovitoye and later the 4th Cavalry Corps towards Abganerovo.
The overwhelming force of the Russian attacks, rapidly compelled the Romanian units to retreat. By the evening, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions were virtually destroyed and the 18th Infantry Division was in danger of being encircled. All contact with its neighbour, the 20th Infantry Division had been lost. Despite the stubborn resistance put up by the 18th Infantry Division, Russian forces continued their advance towards Tundutovo and Ivanovka, breaking into the Divisions rear. The remnants of the Division were destroyed as the pocket was rapidly reduced.
On the 21st of November, the 20th Infantry Division mounted limited counter attacks, which failed to halt the Russian advance. The remnants of the Division were assigned to the German 4th Corps and withdrew into the pocket at Stalingrad.
Given the situation, the 8th Cavalry Division was dispatched to the endangered area while the 4th Infantry Division was assigned to the Romanian 7th Corps.
Meanwhile the 57th Army turned north westwards and continued its advance towards Sovietsky, 17 km southeast of Kalach, where it would attempt to link up with forces of the Southwestern Front.
The 51st Army also continued its advance towards Kotelnikovo, along the Kotelnikovo-Stalingrad railroad. The Romanian 6th Corps formed a new defensive position along the line Mal Derbety - Tundutovo - Gonchearovsky - Gnylo-Aksayskaya, while the 'Korne' Detachment, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Regiments, supported by German armoured units, mounted a counterattack towards Abganerovo. Elements of the German 29th Motorized Infantry Division also mounted an attack to the south of Beketovka. The attack temporarily halted the advance of the 13th Mechanized Corps, but the Division was ordered to move northwards to protect the southern flank of 6th Army and so was forced to disengage.
On the 22nd, the situation worsened, as Russian forces captured Mal Derbety and Tundutovo on the left flank of the Romanian 7th Corps. A Russian armoured force in the Krasnay-Geroy area attacked the 'Korne' Detachment, inflicting heavy losses. In the 6th Corps sector, the remnants of the 1st, 18th and 2nd Infantry Divisions were retreating in disorder and were unable to mount any organized resistance.
On the 23rd of November, as the enemy pressure continued, the remains of the 6th Corps, along with the 'Korne' Detachment, withdrew to the Aksay River, leaving the left flank of the 7th Corps open. In order to prevent the enemy advancing between the rail line and the River Don, a new defence line, centred on Kotelnikovo was established. The line was formed by the 6th Corps on the southern bank of the Aksay River, the 4th Infantry Division between Umansevo and Kotsubayev and the 5th Cavalry Division in the area of Perednaya Elista. The link between the two Corps was provided by the 'Korne' Detachment in the Sutov area. That afternoon, Russian forces of the Stalingrad Front, met those of the Southwestern Front in Sovietsky area, completing the encirclement of the German forces in Stalingrad.
On the 25th of November, Russian forces attacked towards Kotelnikovo, between the Don and the rail line, forcing the 4th Infantry Division to retreat to the south.
On the 26th of November, the 'Korne Detachment mounted a limited counter attack, which regained the ground that had been lost by the 4th Infantry Division the previous day.
The following day, the 27th, the Russian units approaching Kotelnikovo were also repulsed, when a counterattack was mounted by elements of the German 6th Panzer Division, which had recently arrived from refitting in France. During the day, Russian forces managed to break through the line of the 6th Corps, in the 18th Infantry Divisions sector, forcing it to retreat some 25km south of the Aksay River, where it managed to halt the Russian advance and form a new defensive line.

Operation Little Saturn

Following the successful completion of operation Uranus, the STAVKA ordered the commencement of operation Little Saturn. Originally conceived as a deep penetration operation named Saturn, using forces of the Southwestern Front to smash the Italian 8th Army's defensive positions along the middle Don and seize Rostov, the operation had to be scaled down due to the build up of German forces mounting a relief operation towards Stalingrad. The 2nd Guards Army, which was to have been used in the operation, was first diverted to help reduce the Stalingrad pocket and then to counter the German 57th Panzer Corps, which was advancing towards Stalingrad from Kotelnikovski. Operation 'Little Saturn' was revised to include only the envelopment of the Italian 8th Army and German Army Detachment Hollidt, defending positions along the southern banks of the Don and Chir Rivers.
The Italian 8th Army occupied a stretch of front between the Romanian 3rd Army at Vechenskaia in the east and the Hungarian 2nd Army at Palovsk in the west. It was comprised, from east to west, of the 29th Corps, formed by the 3rd Celere, 2nd Sforzesca Infantry and 52nd Torino Semi-Motorized Divisions, the 35th Corps, consisting of the German 298th and Italian 9th Pasubio Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Corps, comprised of the 5th Cosseria and 3rd Ravenna Infantry Divisions, which faced the Russian Don bridgehead at West Mamon and the Alpine Corps, formed by the 2nd Tridentina, 156th Vicenza, 4th Cuneense and 3rd Julia Infantry Divisions. The only reserve formation available to the Army was the German 27th Panzer Division, which could field only fifty serviceable tanks.
Army Detachment Hollidt was comprised of elements of the axis forces displaced during operation Uranus. These included the 29th Corps, formed from the Romanian 7th, 9th and 11th, Italian 2nd Sforcessca, 3rd Celere Duce Amadeo D'Aosta Infantry and 52nd Torino semi motorized Divisions, the 17th Corps which was comprised of the Romanian 1st and 14th Cavalry, 1st Panzer, German 294th infantry, 22nd Panzer and 8th Luftwaffe Field Divisions and the 48th Panzer Corps formed from the German 94th infantry and 6th Panzer Divisions. The 29th Corps occupied a front which ran from Vechenskaya on the Don, to the area of Bokovskaya on the Chir, with the 17th Corps holding a line which ran south, following the Chir River, occupying the area of Bolshoi Ternovsky. As the Chir turned eastwards, back towards the Don, the line was held by the 48th Panzer Corps.
The Russian forces facing them, from west to east, were the 6th Army along the Don, formed by the 127th, 172nd, 350th and 195th Infantry Divisions, supported by the 17th Tank Corps and the 1st Guards Army comprised of the 44th, 38th, 153rd and 197th Infantry Divisions, supported by the 18th, 24th and 25th Tank Corps. Further to the southeast along the Chir, was the 3rd Guards Army, comprised of the 14th and 50th Guards Rifle and the 159th, 203rd, 197th, 266th and 278th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps.
On the 16th of December, the Russian 6th Army broke out of its bridgehead on the Don at West Mamon, and attacked the defences of the Italian 8th Army, with the main thrust directed against the Italian 6th Infantry Division. Once a breach had been made, elements of the army penetrated south and then southwest, breaking into the rear of the Italian 2nd Corps, with the 17th Tank Corps capturing Kantemirovka.
Further to the east, elements of the 1st Guards Army opened their attack with the 44th Infantry Division also attacking the Italian 6th Infantry Division, while the 38th Infantry Division crossed the Don at Bogoutscher and attacked the Italian 8th Infantry Division. Further east still, the 153rd Infantry Division attacked the Italian 10th Infantry Division at Kasanskaia, while the 197th Infantry Division forced the Don further south and attacked the southern flank of the Italian 10th Infantry Division.
The Italian Divisions were quickly overwhelmed and by the 19th, were forced into a general retreat across the whole front. The Italian 35th Corps withdrew southwestwards towards Mankova, while the 29th Corps withdrew in the general direction of Millerovo and Likhaia. The fleeing Italian Divisions finally attempted to form a new defensive line along the Donets River between Likhaia and Vorochilovgrad, which they began to occupy at the end of December.
As the Italian forces withdrew from the Don, the 24th and 25th Tank Corps penetrated deep behind Axis lines, threatening the rear of Detachment Hollidt's positions on the Chir. Also on the Chir, elements of the 3rd Guards Army had broken across the river at Bokovskaia and the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps had pushed through the breach and then headed southeast towards the German airfield at Morozovsk. The Romanian 1st Corps began to retreat southwestwards during the night of the 18th of December, to new positions west of the Chernaya Valley, between Kalinovsky and Verh Tokin. There it was surprised by a mechanized group of the 18th Tank Corps and fierce fighting occurred at Kamenka and Kashary, with heavy losses suffered by the Axis forces.
On the 20th of December, Army Detachment Hollidt was placed in severe danger as the retreating Italians uncovered its left flank. It attempted to establish a new front further south, in conjunction with the 3rd Romanian Army, to protect the airfields at Morozovsk and Tatsinskaya. On the 22nd of December, the line of the River Chir was abandoned by the left wing of Army Detachment Hollidt as it retreated southwest towards Morzovskaya.
By the 23rd of December, the 24th Tank Corps had reached Skassirskaya and the following day overran the German forward airfield at Tatsinskaya, destroying over fifty transport aircraft on the ground as its tanks broke onto the airfield.
By the 24th, the 24th and 25th Tank Corps had penetrated far into the rear of Detachment Hollidt and were threatening those forces, which were withdrawing from the upper Chir River.
Following the breakthrough on the Don, the 1st Guards and 6th Armies wheeled to the southwest, where German forces had formed a defensive line running north-south between the Don and Donets Rivers. The line was held by the German 385th, 367th and Italian Julia Infantry Divisions in the north and the 27th and 19th Panzer Divisions in the south.
At the beginning of January, as Detachment Hollidt began to reassemble in the Kagalnik area, a small Russian force which had crossed the Don River at Novocherkask, had broken into its rear areas. At the same time, to the northwest, the 7th Panzer Division was trying to deflect the advance of Russian forces towards the Donetz crossings at Forchstadt. Meanwhile, to the northeast, the remnants of the Romanian 7th and 8th Divisions were protecting the Donetz crossings at Kamensk.
In the middle of January, elements of the 17th Tank Corps managed to penetrate the line at the junction of the 27th Panzer and 367th Infantry Divisions to the west of Kantemirovka. The penetration was quickly exploited by the Russian forces, which advanced northwestwards into the German and Italian rear areas.

Conclusion

Operation Uranus was an audacious, yet well prepared operation, where the Red Army used overwhelming resources to smash the weakly defended flanks of 6th Army and encircle it within the Stalingrad pocket. During its preparation, STAVKA employed considerable maskirovka to conceal their intentions, a facet which would become a hallmark of future offensive operations, as would the huge artillery preparations which opened the offensive and the far greater superiority in manpower and material which were employed to ensure its success.
However it is possible that this disaster for the German Army could have been averted. Had the German high command have given the Red Army more respect in its capability to mount such an operation and paid greater heed to the numerous reports of the Russian build up, by both Romanian and German units, then surely they would have been in a better position to react to the offensive when it began. They should also have realized that the weakly equipped and overstretched forces protecting the flanks of 6th Army, were such an opportune target for the Red Army.
Worse still, both the German high command, Army Group B HQ and the HQ of 6th Army, were painfully slow to react to the offensive once it had opened. The HQ of 6th Army in particular, despite all the warnings, had taken no action to prepare for such an eventuality. It had failed to reorganise its forces within the city, prepare any kind of mobile reserve or reposition its supply depots. Even the small success enjoyed by the 29th Motorized Infantry Division against the 13th Mechanized Corps to the south of Beketovka, suggested that had Paulus established a strong mobile reserve before the offensive began, he could possibly have halted either pincer and averted the entire encirclement of his Army.
Finally, Hitler's refusal to disengage forces from Stalingrad and allow 6th Army freedom of movement to meet the threat, added to Paulus's unwillingness to take independent action, sealed 6th Army's fate.