Korsun Pocket

Situation

During the Russian winter offensive of 1943-44, the German defences on the middle Dnepr had collapsed under enormous enemy pressure. The Russians had forced crossings of the river and continued their advance westward. Only at one point, the 80-mile wide salient between Kanev and Cherkassy, were German forces still holding on to their defensive positions along the western bank of the river.
The German forces in the salient, part of 8th Army, consisted of two Corps, the 11th and 42nd. These two Corps included the 57th, 88th, 72nd, parts of the 389th Infantry Divisions and the 5th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking. In addition was the Korpsabteilung B, made up from parts of the 258th Regiment and the 112th Infantry division, plus various armoured and other supporting units. An airfield at Korsun also provided the possibility that any units that might become trapped could be re-supplied by air. Despite this, Field Marshal Von Manstein, commander of Army Group South, had requested repeatedly that the two Corps be allowed to withdraw from the salient in order to straighten the German line. However Hitler refused, ordering that the salient be held, despite the risk of encirclement. He proposed that once the Russian offensive had been halted, it would be used as a springboard for an offensive to recapture Kiev.
Stavka saw the opportunity that an encirclement of the forces in the salient provided. Not only would it enable the destruction of a large part of the German 8th Army, but even more appealing was the idea that any retreat by Army Group South could lead to another major German force, Army Group A, being cut off further to the south in the Crimea.
To achieve these goals, the Ukrainian Front Group, led by Generals Konev and Vatutin were tasked to attack the flanks of the salient, from the southeast and northwest. Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of the 1st and 6th Tank and 40th Armies, while Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front consisted of the 5th Tank and 4th and 53rd Armies. The 27th and 52nd Armies would press the northern and eastern faces of the salient along the Dnepr river positions.

The Pocket Closes

The two Ukrainian Front Groups began their attempt to encircle the German forces in the salient on the 24th of January 1944. The forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which attacked from the southeast and drove along the southern side of the salient, made excellent progress, severing the link between the 11th and 42nd Corps and the remainder of the 8th Army.
Meanwhile the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked from the northwest and drove down the western flank of the salient. The German 7th Corps took the brunt of the attack and crumbled under the onslaught. The 88th and 198th Divisions fought desperately against the Russian tanks. These units, with little armoured support, were the only forces available to hold the line. If they failed to do so, the path lay open towards the 5th Tank Army, less than 90km to the southeast. If the two forces were able to link up, the salient would be cut off and the pocket closed. This was achieved on February the 28th, near Zvenigorodka, when elements of the 6th Tank Army and the 5th Tank Army linked up near the town. The fate of 57,000 German soldiers trapped in the 'Korsun Pocket' now hung in the balance.
Following the closure of the pocket, command of the entire force passed to General Wilhelm Stemmerman and the force within became known as Group Stemmerman. The most rational solution would have been to attempt an immediate breakout, before the encirclement could be secured. In addition to saving the men trapped in the pocket, the void now created between the 1st Panzer Army on the left and the remainder of the 8th Army on the right could be filled. However Hitler forbade this and ordered that Group Stemmerman hold firm in the pocket. Hitler saw an opportunity to encircle the Russian forces that surrounded the pocket and destroy them, convinced that they were considerably weakened. However the units ordered to carry out this encirclement were at half strength or less, except for the recently arrived 22nd Panzer Division, and even their equipment was badly in need of repair. The German logistical situation was perilous, with men and materials in short supply. Following the debilitating Russian winter offensive, this was compounded by poor ground conditions, constant Russian air attacks on convoys and frequent partisan attacks. German moral was also at a very low ebb. In addition the first week in February saw an early warming of the weather, which proved disastrous to the movement of the German forces.

The German Counter Attack Begins

On the morning of February 4th, General Breith initiated the attack against the Russian forces surrounding the pocket, thrusting from the south with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions. However the attack coincided with the start of the dreaded 'rasputitsa' or spring thaw. Movement, where possible at all, was slowed to a crawl and the advance soon became bogged down. To the south of Medvin, the tanks of Oberstleutnant Bake's Heavy Panzer Regiment led the way, with the 34th and 198th Infantry Divisions protecting their flanks. Bake's panzers slowly managed to advance only six miles, against heavy resistance and atrocious ground conditions. Throughout a day of heavy fighting, both sides suffered loss, but the Russians held their ground and the panzers could get no closer.
General Breith though, refused to give up. With parts of the SS LAH Division on hand and the advance elements of the 1st Panzer Division now arriving, he committed them to the action. He radioed the forces in the pocket with the simple message, 'I'm coming!'
On the 8th of February the 1st Panzer Division captured Bushanka. Finally, on February the 8th, the Russians were forced into a withdrawal back over the Gniloy Tikich River where the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions were able to establish a small bridgehead. However poor ground conditions and stiff Russian resistance halted any further advance there. The German forces trapped in the Korsun pocket would have to fight their way out to them.
On the 12th of February, the SS LAH Division battled against Russian forces at Vinograd, while the 16th Panzer Division encountered resistance on the road to Medvin. The 17th Panzer Division also became engaged in a tank battle against elements of the Russian 6th Tank Army to the southwest of Medvin. The 1st Panzer Division meanwhile, continued to press its attack towards Lysianka. Further north, elements of the 47th Panzer Corps stalled at Zvenigorodka, 30km from the pocket and 25km from the 3rd Panzer Corps, its strength expended.

The Pocket Moves South

General Stemmerman quickly realized the seriousness of the situation. Only quick and decisive action could save the situation from becoming a major disaster. The forces in the pocket would have to be rescued soon, but first the pocket would have to hold firm. To accomplish this, the establishment of new fronts was initiated at possible breakout points, mostly along the southern edge of the pocket. Initially most of the German forces were facing north and east, along the Dnepr River. Units would have to be repositioned to secure the perimeter of the pocket.
Orders were received from 8th Army, 'Group Stemmerman will shorten the front lines and move the pocket in the direction of Shenderovka in order to be able, when the time comes, to break out towards the forces mounting a relief attack from outside.'
This would require a masterful handling of the forces within the pocket. Stemmerman took on the task with a vengeance and successfully contracted the northern edge of the pocket, with 42nd Corps abandoning the Dnepr River positions. At the same time, the pocket was extended to the south by 11th Corps, with the objective of capturing the key villages of Shenderovka, Novaya-Buda and Komarovka. The focal point of all activity was Korsun, which lay in the centre of the pocket and provided the pocket's only airfield. Here supplies were flown in and casualties flown out, by up to 70 aircraft per day, as the weather permitted. It was the only contact that the German forces had with the outside of the pocket, with the exception of radio communications.

The Pocket is Reduced

At Novaya-Buda the severely weakened 105th Regiment of the 72nd Division was tasked with assaulting the village. The Regimental commander, Major Kaestner, knowing he would have to cross an open slope to reach his objective, chose to make a night attack. The attack was made on the night of February 11th. Moving silently with bayonets, knives and entrenching tools, the men of the 105th crept toward the Russian positions. They could hear enemy soldiers chatting and an occasional burst of laughter. Suddenly, they were challenged by a Russian sentry. The regiment charged the surprised enemy, firing as they ran. Fighting was fierce as shock troops roved up and down the trenches finishing what remained of the Russian resistance.
On the 12th of February, Korsun was abandoned, along with its precious airfield. Almost 3000 wounded men were left behind there with medics to await capture by the Russians. No further supplies were received or wounded airlifted out after this date. On the 13th, inside the pocket, the 105th Regiment took 240 prisoners and destroyed 21 tanks in an assault on the village of Komarovka, but suffered heavy losses maintaining control of the town. The village of Shenderovka was taken later that afternoon, securing the planned breakout area.
By February 15th, the pocket had moved with a masterful fluidity, maintaining its flanks against constant Russian pressure, not only from the pursuing ground forces but also from constant air attacks, to the jump-off point at Shenderovka. The same day, the 105th Regiment captured the village of Chilki, and then repulsed heavy Russian counter-attacks. The pocket was now centred on the village of Shenderovka and had been reduced to an area of 56sq km, containing around 40,000 men.

The 3rd Panzer Corps is Halted

On the 15th of February, Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Corps made one last push from their bridgehead on the Gniloy Tikich, to capture Hill 239, northwest of the river. The area of the hill was held by elements from the 6th Tank and 27th Armies. But by this time the Russians had prepared strong defensive positions and were continually being reinforced. Despite their best efforts the tanks of the 1st and 17th Panzer Divisions were unable to capture the hill, their advance grinding to halt along a line formed by the towns of Lysianka, Oktyabr and Chishintsy, about 12km short of the objective.
This meant that the men trapped in the pocket would have to fight their way out against Russian infantry supported by armour, in well prepared positions. The Russians occupied two sets of positions, the inner ring facing Group Stemmerman and an outer ring that was holding off the 3rd Panzer Corps efforts to break through.
On the same day 8th Army issued new orders to the forces trapped in the pocket, 'Group Stemmerman must perform a breakthrough as far as Zhurzintsy/Hill 239 by its own effort. There it will link up with the 3rd Panzer Corps.'
However the message did not clarify that Hill 239 was still in Russian hands. Stemmerman concluded from the message that friendly forces held the hill. He immediately began preparations for the breakout. Stemmerman would remain with the rearguard troops and General Lieb would lead the breakout. Once it began, however, there would be little communication between units. Local commanders retained strong discipline among individual units.

The Breakout

By the 16th of February, the besieged forces of Group Stemmerman had been under siege for almost three weeks and the situation was becoming more desperate with each passing day.
Fearing that Hitler might postpone the breakout and knowing of the steadily weakening condition of the forces inside the pocket, Von Manstein made the decision to order General Stemmerman to begin the breakout attempt. The codeword was Watchword Freedom. His communiqué stated simply, 'Watchword Freedom, objective Lysianka, 2300 hours.' After issuing the order to break out, Manstein had attempted to warn Stemmerman that Hill 239 was still in enemy hands. But all radios had been destroyed and there was no further communication with the trapped troops.
Within minutes, Stemmerman's chief of staff, Colonel Franz, had read the message. The entire force was advised and the battle plan for the breakout, involving a three-pronged attack by the group, was put into action.
To the northwest, Corps Detachment B would lead the right wing of the breakout. In the centre, the 105th Regiment would again lead the way. Their success at Novaya-Buda had earned them the respect of the entire group.
The southwestern effort would be lead by elements of the 5th SS Wiking Division. General Stemmerman would remain with the covering forces and control the withdrawal. All unnecessary items of heavy equipment were left behind.
At 03:30 hours the breakout commenced. The 105th Regiment moved silently in the darkness until they reached the base of Hill 239. A reconnaissance patrol led by Lieutenant Bender moved ahead to scout out the area. It was hoped that he would make contact with units of the 1st Panzer Division. However Lieutenant Bender soon returned with grim news. 'There are tanks ahead, but not ours. A half dozen T-34s are stationed on the road ahead and there are more further to the west.' The way was not open after all and the lead units realised that they would have to fight through the Russian positions before reaching the safety of 1st Panzers positions.
Major Kaestner reorganized his force and readied them for a swift assault. Kaestner's men moved silently towards the Russian position once again. Again they assaulted with bayonets, knives and entrenching tools. The Russian infantry fled firing wildly into the darkness. However this only alerted the tank commanders who quickly turned on their vehicle searchlights, illuminating the fleeing mass of German troops.
Now there was no orderly movement, it was every man for himself. All along the line the German units moved frantically ahead, suffering horrendous casualties. They had no choice but to move forward.
The units of the 1st Panzer Division and Bake's Heavy Regiment, hearing the carnage moved forward to offer what help they could.
All that remained of the 105th Regiment, about 220 men from an original compliment of 1100, finally reached their rescuers at Lysianka. Loudly shouting the password, 'Freedom, freedom!' they were greeted by Lieutenant Freiherr von Dornberg, who welcomed Kaestner with an embrace.
Meanwhile A renewed Russian attack on the German rear was repulsed by the 5th Panzer regiment of the Wiking division, which was itself completely destroyed in the process. During the day General Stemmerman had been killed by anti-tank fire as he attempted to change command posts and General Lieb had assumed command.
Leon Degrell, serving with the Wallonian Brigade, part of the SS Wiking Division, described the ensuing panic. 'In a frantic race to escape, some carts carrying the wounded overturned. Suddenly a column of Russian tanks appeared and drove over the carts, smashing them one by one like boxes of matches. They machine gunned the horses and ran over the wounded crushing them beneath their tracks.'

Heroes in the Darkness

Amongst the chaos, men from the 3rd Company of the 389th Panzerjaeger Battalion, saw the calamity unfolding. Staff Sergeant Krause who was leading the Company ordered his men into action. They moved quickly to the top of a nearby hill with some panzerfausts, finding seven T-34's firing down on the columns. They fired at the nearest vehicles, destroying two of them. The remaining vehicles, unable to see where the attack had come from, panicked and moved away.
Elsewhere a column from the Wiking Division was under attack from Russian tanks when a roaring cheer was heard. To the columns amazement, an officer on horseback appeared from a nearby ravine leading a force of some 3000 men. The man on horseback was Lieutenant Colonel Muller, waving his men forward as they smashed into the Russian lines. Even though dozens fell to concentrated gunfire the enemy line was broken and moved away. The men that were left moved on into the woods and headed toward the river.
Colonel Franz had witnessed the slaughter of the wounded of the Wiking Division and had a horse shot out from under him during the melee. Proceeding on foot, he joined up with another group of soldiers and moved with them. Suddenly rifle and machine gun fire broke out in front of them. Two soldiers of the Wallonian Brigade appeared. They warned of a Russian machine gun position blocking the way in front of them. Franz quickly grabbed a sniper rifle and moved forward towards the enemy position. With his telescopic sight, the Colonel sighted three enemy soldiers manning a machine gun. Taking quick aim, he snapped off three shots, killing them all. Franz stood, and waved the remainder of his group forward.

The Gniloy Tikich River

By late morning, the escaping troops of Group Stemmerman had reached the bank of the Gniloy Tikich River. The early thaw had raised the level of the river and increased its flow into a roaring torrent, which now blocked their way. The waterway was 30 yards wide and about six feet deep. There was no bridge to be seen and crossing it seemed impossible.
Unknown to the group, about a mile to the northwest, the 1st Panzer division had a bridge under their control and the engineers of the Jena Armoured Engineer Battalion had also erected a smaller footbridge.
As the first arrivals milled around the river, the first T-34's appeared in the distance. Firing high-explosive shells and ricocheting airbursts, they caused panic. For many, the choice was clear. They would either have to brave the strong current or die where they stood.
Whole groups of men jumped in and began to try to cross. Many were swept away by the current, or dragged under by the weight of their uniforms and drowned. Men began to strip in order to improve their chances of survival. However those who reached the other side were suffering terribly from the cold, the temperature that morning was -5°C. The men still had over a mile to walk through the snow before they reached the safety of the German lines.
Some units attempted the crossing in some semblance of order. General Herbert Gille, commander of the Wiking Division, ordered that a tractor be driven into the middle of the river to act as a temporary pier, but the tractor was soon swept away. He then organised human chains, alternating a swimmer and a non-swimmer to extend across the river. It worked well until the numbing effects of the water caused a man to lose his grip. Suddenly the chain was broken and the surging currents carried the men away.
Once the first survivors reached the first positions of the LAH and 1st Panzer Divisions, they realized the desperate situation unfolding to their south. One group on the other side of the river moved to help in bringing some of the refugees to the crossings to their north. A group of tanks and engineers immediately went to the crossing site further south to assist their fellow soldiers.
The crossings continued throughout the day. Rear guard units of the Group pulled out successfully and made the crossing. By the end of the 16th, most of the fighting at the river had ended and the majority of the survivors from the pocket were across. The German lines had been straightened and nearly 35,000 of the original 56,000 men were saved. Over 10,000 men were killed and another 17,000 captured.

Conclusion

The Russians were now becoming skilled in the execution of the sustained all arms offensive. Their troops were now more experienced and better equipped with simple and effective weaponry. Their overwhelming resources of manpower and determination to rid the Motherland of the hated German invader were beginning to exact a heavy cost on the German army.
The German forces were hampered by Hitler's continual interference. His repeated reluctance to give up ground in order to improve the tactical situation doomed the two Corps trapped in the salient. Hitler's inaccurate view of the situation belied the fact that most of his Divisions were badly under strength, poorly equipped and exhausted.
The Luftwaffe was again unable, as at Stalingrad, to re-supply the forces trapped in the pocket by air. Russian air superiority and a lack of fighters to support the transports lead to heavy losses. Poor ground conditions, as so often during the Russian campaign, badly affected German mobility. This debilitated offensive operations outside the pocket and the ability of the forces inside the pocket to manoeuvre.
While the Russians had not succeeded in destroying the two Corps trapped in the pocket, they had successfully neutralized the fighting ability of over six German divisions. Most of the men rescued had no weapons and all their heavy equipment had been abandoned. German forces had lost their foothold along the Dnepr.
The Russian forces would regroup and prepare for a new offensive during the summer. Operation Bagration, against German Army Group Centre, which would drive the Germans out of Byelorussia.