The 3rd Battle of Kharkov

Situation

Following the catastrophic capitulation of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, an even greater disaster loomed for the German southern wing of the Eastern Front in the early part of 1943. Between Voroshilovgrad and Belgorod, a 200-mile wide gap had been opened in the German front line following the collapse of the Allied Armies.
Strong Russian mobile forces from the Voronezh and South Western Fronts had been driving into this gap since the beginning of January, with the aim of crossing the Donets River, striking towards Kharkov and then onwards to the Dnepr River. Meanwhile the Southern Front was advancing towards Rostov and threatening to cut off German forces to its east. The crisis point had arrived for the German forces in the south. Army Group Don was in danger of having its lines of communication and supply cut, but worse still, Army Group A in the Kuban and Crimea, was in grave danger of being trapped and lost altogether.

Fighting Withdrawal

By the 14th of January, the 1st Panzer Army had completed its withdrawal eastwards to a line running from Cherkask in the north to Petrovskoye in the south, where it would attempt to hold open the lines of communication for Army Group A, which was still encamped in the Caucasus. The 4th Panzer Army was also holding a defensive line to the west of Salsk, to cover the withdrawal of 1st Panzer Army towards Rostov. Further north, on the 16th of January the Fretter-Pico Group was ordered to begin its withdrawal towards the Donetz positions west of Voroshilovgrad.
On the 20th of January, Russian forces of the Southern Front launched an offensive over the Lower Manych River in the direction of Rostov, using four armoured Corps. The 16th Panzer Division, facing this offensive on the northern wing of 4th Panzer Army, was unable to halt its progress. On the 25th of January, a successful counter attack was launched against Russian forces threatening the Rostov crossings over the Lower Manych River. By the 27th of January, 1st Panzer Army had begun to move north westwards towards Rostov, behind the protective screen of 4th Panzer Army. On the 29th of January, Manstein moved his headquarters from Taganrog to Stalino as the Army Groups focus of attention shifted from the Don to the Donets River area. On the 5th of February Rostov again came under threat, with Russian forces capturing Bataisk to the southwest of the city. By this time 1st Panzer Army had completed its withdrawal westward through the city and was being held in the middle Donetz area just north of Stalino. The 4th Panzer Army had also begun the process of moving back through Rostov and over to the western wing of the Army Group.

Von Manstein

Von Manstein flew to a meeting with Hitler on the 6th of February to implore him to allow Army Detachment Hollidt to withdraw to prepared positions on the Mius River, where it could maintain a shortened but more solid defence line. In addition he proposed a counter offensive against the advancing Russian forces using the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies on his threatened Northern wing. Hitler finally gave in to his requests and granted him freedom of action to implement his plan.

Kharkov is Lost

Further north the situation around the city of Kharkov had deteriorated considerably. Army Detachment Lanz was engaged in heavy fighting as it withdrew to the east and south east of the city. By the 12th of February, Russian forces of the 3rd Tank and 69th Armies had penetrated into the north western and south eastern suburbs of the city and brought the road to Poltava, the only route into the city, under artillery fire. Within the city groups of Partisans were openly engaging German troops. Chaos ensued as streams of civilians mingled with the columns of German units cramming the roads as they tried to escape westwards before the city became encircled.
General Hausser, commander of the SS Panzer Corps defending the city, authorised its evacuation and began to withdraw from the city on the 15th of February, despite repeated orders from the Fuhrer to hold on regardless of the situation. The Gross Deutschland Division broke out to the south east of the city and the following day the rear guard formed by the SS Das Reich Division finally withdrew as Partisans hoisted the Russian flag in Red Square. The resilience of the German forces defending Kharkov had also allowed the struggling 320th Infantry Division sufficient time to withdraw and link up with Army Detachment Lanz to the west of the city.

The Russian offensive Stalls

The Russian high command concluded that Kharkov would only have been abandoned under Hitler's express order and that Army Group South must therefor be in full retreat. STAVKA ordered that the offensive be resumed with all haste. However in the chaos that ensued around Kharkov following its fall, it took Russian forces three full days to re-organise and re-orientate as they attempted to continue the advance. However despite this lull, which allowed the German forces a short respite, none of the Russian forces were re-equipped or brought up to full strength.
The forces of the Voronezh Front were ordered to push on to the Dnepr River. The Russian 6th and 1st Guards Armies were to advance westwards between Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye and force crossings of the river. Further south Popov's armoured combat group consisting of four tank Corps, two armoured Brigades and a ski Brigade was manoeuvring south from Slavyansk into the rear of the positions of 1st Panzer Army and Army Detachment Hollidt along the Mius River. Further south still, forces of the South Western and Southern Fronts were attempting to break through the same Mius positions from the east. The 1st and 3rd Guards and the 5th Tank and 5th Shock Armies pressed the northern flank between Voroshilovgrad and Slavyansk while the 28th, 51st and 2nd Guards Armies attacked the southern flank, north of Rostov.
Units of the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps had broken through the positions of the German 17th Armoured Corps west of Voroshilovgrad, near Matvayev Kurgan, on the 18th of February. A rapid counter attack by the 16th Motorised Infantry and 23rd Panzer Divisions closed the base of the penetration and encircled the Russian force, which was systematically destroyed.
Despite this small success, a huge gap still existed between 1st Panzer Army on the northern flank of the Mius positions and Army Group Kempf (Lanz) further to the north. Group Popov, thrust into this gap and advanced south through Krasnoarmeyskoye towards Stalino. However the Germans had moved the 40th Panzer Corps to block Popov's advance. The Panzer Corps consisted of the 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions, the 5th SS Wiking Division and the 333rd Infantry Division newly arrived from France.
Further north elements of the Russian 6th Army were still advancing towards the Dnepr. The 267th Rifle Division had penetrated to the south of Krasnograd and the 35th Guards Rifle Division had captured Pavlograd. On the 19th of February the 25th Tank Corps reached the rail junction at Sinelnikovo and severed the only direct rail link to Hollidt's forces on the Mius. This also brought the Russians within 40 miles of Manstein's HQ at Zaporozhye.

Manstein's Counter Offensive

The only unit available to retake Sinelnikovo, was the entrained 15th Infantry Division, almost at the end of its rail transit from France. Its advanced party had arrived in Dnepropetrovsk on the 18th and once located, its forward companies were ordered to move directly by rail to Sinelnikovo. The Division's advance elements detrained in the town on the night of the 20th February and recaptured it. The group was gradually reinforced and despite heavy counter attacks by the Russian's, the town was held.
The same day, Manstein moved against the bulk of Popov's Group, which had halted its advance just north of Krasnoarmeyskoye. While the SS Wiking Division blocked its advance, using sweeping artillery fire to convince Popov's group into thinking that a much larger force was holding them up, the 11th Panzer Division cut Popov's supply lines between Slavyansk and Barvenkovo. The 7th Panzer Division wheeled south around the bulge formed by Popov's Group and then north towards Izyum. On the 21st, Popov realising the seriousness of his situation, implored his Army commander General Vatutin, to authorise the withdrawal of his Group. Popov's request was refused and he was told to continue his attack immediately.
Further north, also on the 20th, the 4th Panzer Army consisting of the 48th and SS Panzer Corps under Hoth, moved against the 1st Guards and 6th Armies. Hoth used his SS Panzer Corps from the northwest and the 48th Panzer Corps from the southeast in a pincer movement, which was to join at Pavlograd cutting off the leading formations of 6th Army.
The SS Das Reich, driving from their positions around Poltava, captured Novo-Moskovsk on the Samara River on February 20th. It then advanced towards Pavlograd the following day, trapping substantial numbers of Russian troops south of the Samara. On the 23rd of February, it linked up with the 6th Panzer Division near Pavlograd, inflicting heavy losses on the 15th and 4th Guards Rifle Corps, which were all but destroyed. This left the 25th Tank Corps cut off southwest of Pavlograd. It's commander, Major General Pavlov, informed Kharitonov at Army HQ of its situation and requested new orders. He was told to continue the attack towards Zaporozhye. When the decoded message reached Hoth's HQ he simply commented, 'Suits us!'
As late as the 21st of February, situation reports between the Army Group and Front HQ's, intercepted by German intelligence units, suggested that the Russian's believed German forces were still retreating westwards. Manstein had achieved complete surprise. By the 23rd, the last resistance of Popov's forces trapped in the Krasnoarmeyskoye area had been broken. The remnants of the Group attempted to escape to the north, despite having very little fuel or ammunition. On the 24th, Vatutin, commander of the South Western Front, finally realised the gravity of the situation and suspended all offensive operations. However it was already too late, for the 40th Panzer Corps had pushed past Barvenkovo. Meanwhile the 333rd Infantry Division had captured Krasnoarmeyskoye on the 27th of February and further north the 3rd Panzer Division had cut the Izyum - Slavyansk road. The following day the 7th Panzer Division reached the Donets River to the south of Izyum. In a vain effort to assist the withdrawal of 6th Army to the northeast, a combat group assembled from 3rd Tank Army and commanded by General Rybalko, was to attack southwards in a bid to deflect Hausser's SS Panzer Corps and protect Kharkov. However Hausser wheeled the SS LAH Division behind the Russian force and pinned it against the SS Totenkopf and Das Reich Divisions west of Bereka. The Russian group was encircled on the 3rd of March and relentless air attacks by the Luftwaffe savaged the forces trapped in the pocket. On March 6th, SS LAH, gained a bridgehead over the Mosh River at Bridok, opening the way to Kharkov. Three Russian armies stood in their way, the 69th to the north of Kharkov, the 40th to the south and the 3rd Tank Army defending the city itself.

Kharkov is Recaptured

To the south of Kharkov the 25th Guards Rifle Division was trying to halt the 48th Panzer Corps, which was advancing north towards the city. The Russian Division managed to delay the advancing German forces for almost five days, but following the destruction of the 3rd Army combat group near Bereka, the SS Panzer Corps advanced towards Kharkov from the west. The leading elements of the Panzer Corps reached the western suburbs on the 8th of March. On the 9th of March, Hausser was ordered to seal of the city to the west and north, make a reconnaissance of the city and if the possibility of its swift capture arose, to take it. The LAH Division penetrated into the city from the north on the 11th of March and ran into stiff resistance from Russian troops in the suburb of Alexayevka. By the end of the day they had only reached the Severnyi railway yards.
On the western side of Kharkov, the Das Reich Division had advanced from Sinolisovska along the Poltava road headed for Kharkov. Despite heavy fighting by late afternoon it had reached the suburb of Zalyutino. At Zalyutino it was stopped by a deep anti-tank ditch, covered by anti-tank guns and artillery.
On the 12th of March the SS LAH resumed its advance. Following heavy fighting against the Russian 19th Rifle Division, it had reached the Central Railway Station, Kharkov Airfield and Dzerzhinsky Square by the end of the day. It was also engaged in heavy house to house fighting in the suburbs of Lisaya Gora and Pavlovka.
However the Das Reich was forced to disengage and move round the north of the city to its eastern edge, in order to prevent elements of the 25th Guards Rifle Division escaping to the east. The Das Reich Division moved round the city and dislodged the 1288th Rifle Regiment, sealing the pocket on the 15th of March. The same day units of the LAH Division captured the Tractor Factory and the last Russian units in the city surrendered.
The Gross Deutschland division captured Borosovka and the SS Panzer Corps pushed on towards Belgorod. The Russian 69th Army, which was defending the city, was unable to offer any organised resistance. It began to withdraw to avoid encirclement on the 17th March and the SS Panzer Corps entered the city on the 18th.
The onset of bad weather and the exhaustion of German forces brought an end to all offensive actions. Despite its perilous position at the beginning of February, the German southern wing had reversed almost all the Russian gains made during the winter and had stabilised the situation in the area. Despite the loss of the Caucasus, total disaster had been averted.

Conclusion

Hitler's continual interference led to the perilous state of the German position in early 1943. His refusal to allow the withdrawal of Army Group A from the Caucasus and give freedom of movement to allow Army Group Don to shorten its front and conduct a mobile defence, had overstretched German forces on the southern wing to the limit. Matters were made worse by his unwillingness to provide sufficient reinforcements to bolster those forces as they attempted to halt the Russian offensives in the area. Only Manstein's composure, tactical guile and steadfastness in the face of Hitler's obstinacy allowed the situation to be temporarily restored.
The over confidence of STAVKA and its eagerness to extend the offensive and destroy the entire German southern wing caused its eventual demise, as Russian forces became over extended and exhausted. Delays and confusion following the recapture of Kharkov allowed German forces breathing space to re-deploy. No time or resources were provided to re-fit depleted Russian units and left them weakened for the second phase of the offensive. This allowed Manstein to exploit these failings and force a considerable defeat on the Russians, restoring the position on the southern wing of the Eastern Front.