The Red Air Force

At the beginning of WWII Russia had the most powerful air force in the world, in terms of both numbers and technical excellence. However, Soviet aircraft industry had its weaknesses, most notably in engine development and production standards. The Red Air Force or VVS, like the other services, had also suffered badly during Stalin's purges of the high command from 1937 onwards. This lead to a disorganised and inexperienced command structure, ill prepared for war.
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the VVS was not prepared for action. Over 43% of its pilots and 90% of its formation commanders had completed less than six months service. Although some pilots had gained combat experience during the Spanish Civil War and the Russo-Finish War, on the whole the majority of pilots were poorly trained and had little experience. Despite the combat experience previously gained, Russian fighter tactics proved outdated and ineffective. Of the aircraft available, fewer than a quarter of the VVS's fighters were modern aircraft such as the MiG-3 and LaGG-3 and a further quarter were biplanes such as the I-153. The remainder were obsolete I-16's, which were the most numerous type of plane in use at the time.
The air force consisted of four distinct groups. The long range air force, which comprised of five air Corps. The Naval air force, which consisted of four fleets, Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific. Finally the VVS, which formed the Front air forces and was organisationally part of the Red Army, its purpose being to primarily support ground forces. The Front air forces at the outset of the campaign were assigned to the military Fronts, Northern, Northwestern, Western, South-western, Southern, and Reserve. The Front air forces were comprised of a total of 38 Air Divisions, each consisting of between 3 and 6 regiments to each division. Each regiment was formed from 4 squadrons with a maximum of l5 aircraft per squadron. This amounted to an available total of approximately 5700 aircraft (including 500 reserve aircraft between Moscow and the Urals) of which roughly 3000 were fighters and 2000 bombers and ground attack aircraft. However the insufficient construction of properly prepared forward airfields led to a poor distribution of these resources and a dangerous concentration of aircraft on those airfields that were available. The rigidity of Russian air tactics at the start of Barbarossa was almost unbelievable. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described an incident at a bridge on the Duna River which had been captured intact by the Germans. On that occasion wave after wave of Russian bombers attacked the bridge at low altitude. At the end of the day, 64 attacking Russian aircraft had been destroyed by German fighters and flak.34 In the Red Air Force, blind obedience to the flight leader was the norm. General Lovtved-Hardegg stated that only the flight leader in Russian bomber formations actually knew what the target was, and he was also the only crew member with an aeronautical chart.
On the first day of the German invasion, the VVS lost 336 aircraft in aerial combat and a further 800 aircraft destroyed on the ground in the course of pre-emptive raids against airfields, communications centres and fuel dumps by the Luftwaffe.
However the VVS did manage to mount some offensive operations despite these catestrophic losses. In June raids were carried out against airfields in Finland and northern Norway. Russian aircraft also struck at cities and industrial targets ranging from Königsberg and Danzig in the north to Bucharest and the Ploesti oilfields in the south. A series of raids were also carried out against Berlin during August and September.
In late 1941, following the relocation of Soviet inustry, the MiG-3 and LaGG-3 and soon the Yak-1, began to arrive in greater numbers from the factories. These were also suplemented by British and American aircraft supplied as part of the Lend-Lease agreement.
During the defence of Moscow during the winter of 1941-42, the Russians recognised the advantage of the mass air offensive and most importantly, the fact that control of the air was a prerequisite for a successful ground offensive. Air forces from the Western, Reserve and newly formed Bryansk Fronts as well as from the Moscow Military District took part in the air defence of the capital and the subsequent Russian winter counter offensive.
In April 1942, STAVKA appointed General A. Novikov as commander of the VVS and Deputy Commisar for Aviation. Novikov immediately set about rejuvenating the Red Air Force. He combined Front and Army Air Units into combined Air Armies. These large operational formations maximised the effective use of frontal aviation, concentrating air strength in support of ground operations. Each Air Army was allocated to support an Army Front. Close cooperation was ensured by placing the Air Army's deputy commander and his staff with the HQ of the Army Front to enable direct contact. The Front and Air Army commander's jointly worked out opearational plans, with the Army Front commander determining the priority of missions. The first Air Armies were formed in May 1942 with others following in June, July, August and November, by which time 13 separate Air Armies had been formed. Each Air Army consisted of two fighter air Divisions, each formed from four Regiments, two mixed air Divisions, each formed from two fighter and two ground attack Regiments. In addition to this was added a bomber Regiment, an air reconnaissance Regiment, a night bomber Regiment and a training Regiment. Air Regiments were also based around dedicated types of aircraft, helping to eliminate the logistical difficulties that arose from trying to maintain a variety of different aircraft types. The strength of the Air Regiment was increased from two squadrons to three, operating a total of 32 aircraft per Regiment. The centralisation of air Regiments also simplified operational planning, logistics, training, maintainence and command. Particular efforts were made to destroy German forward airfields and concentrate air resources against key areas involving increased liaison with ground forces. For the first time during the campaign the Red Air Force gained numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. The quality of its aircraft and the proficiency of its pilots had also greatly improved.
In April 1943 the VVS began a series of long range raids on targets in East Prussia, using both Il-4's and Pe-8's. However the aircraft were soon reallocated to missions against tactical targets nearer the front line.
Following the battle of Stalingrad, aircraft of the Northern Caucasus Front air force and the Black Sea Fleet air force supported the Russian ground offensive against the Kuban bridgeheads in the Crimea. By the end of June 1943, Russian aircraft enjoyed air superiority over the Kuban region. Ground attack aircraft were employed in large formations against ground targets as were tactical bombers and fighter forces were co-ordinated by a series of ground control radio stations.
In preparation for the battle of Kursk the Russian air force took the initiative and launched a series of air strikes against German airfields, troop concentrations and supply depots, mounted by six air Armies. The result of these concentrated attacks forced the Luftwaffe to move its airfields further from the front and disperse their aircraft more thoroughly. Strenuous efforts were also made to upgrade forward airfields prior to the battle. During the battle itself the Red air force engaged in an intense air battle with the Luftwaffe. It also carried out concentrated attacks against ground targets with IL-2's taking a heavy toll against German armoured forces. Russian aircraft gradually wrestled control of the air from the Luftwaffe, which no doubt helped stall the German offensive which gradually came to a halt in mid July.
From this point onwards, the Red Air Force enjoyed ever greater air superiority in the east. Russian forces gradually steamrollered their way westwards toward Germany. The Russian air force gained such a numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe that it was barely able to offer any kind of threat. Improvements in tactics, radio communication, navigational skills, bombing accuracy and support services all helped to improve the VVS's performance. In addition, Russian industrial output increased rapidly while German output was heavily affected by allied bombing raids.
In the winter and spring of 1944, four Air Armies assisted with the combined offensives by Russian forces which liberated the eastern bank of the Dnepr River. Despite the bad weather which reduced available flying hours, the VVS was flying up to 2000 sorties per day. In April the two Air Armies and the air force of the Black Sea Fleet assisted in the offensive to recapture of the Crimea. The offensive rapidly liberated the Black Sea port of Sevastopol and the remainder of the Crimea. By the beginning of the Belorussian offensives in July 1944, the VVS outnumbered the Luftwaffe almost 5 to 1 in terms of available aircraft. Four Air Armies supported the offensive. A huge pre-emptive airstrike proceeded the opening of the operation, which resulted in the liberation of Belorussia, most of Latvia and Lithuania, part of Eastern Poland and dealt a crushing defeat on German Army Group Centre. The air operation was the largest of the entire war, with a total of over 153, 000 sorties being flown.
By January 1945, the VVS enjoyed a numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe of almost 8 to 1. Russian forces began their drive into Prussia, Western Poland and Germany itself. Five Air Armies supported the offensives which captured all of Eastern Prussia and opened the gateway into Germany itself.
The final offensive against Berlin began on the 15th of April and was supported by two Air Armies. Again mass strikes pre-empted the offensive which, following an almost total air blockade of Berlin, resulted in the cities capitulation on the 2nd of May 1945.

Conclusion

Despite the German attempt to deal a telling blow to the Red Air Force at the beginning of the campaign, the Luftwaffe failed to completely destroy its fighting capability. The Russian air forces tendency to design simple, reliable, durable aircraft that could be mass produced, enabled it to recover from the huge losses it sustained at the outset of the campaign. The tenacity of Russian pilots coupled with the air forces ability to adapt and improve its operational procedures enabled it to equal the Luftwaffe by mid 1943. The gradual weakening of German manufacturing capability through allied bombing and the opening of the western European theatre, gradually enabled the Red Air Force to overwhelm the Luftwaffe and gain almost total air superiority on all fronts by mid 1944.